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Abstract  The  organizational  structure  of  multinational  enterprises  (MNEs)  is  mainly  made  up
of subsidiaries  located  in  emerging  and  advanced  countries.  Consequently,  they  usually  compete
against the  same  rivals  simultaneously  in  both  emerging  and  advanced  contexts.  Multimarket
contact (MMC)  theory  analyzes  the  competitive  dynamics  that  arise  in  these  situations.  However,
researchers  have  paid  more  attention  to  the  consequences  of  multimarket  contact  in  developed
countries than  to  its  effect  in  emerging  countries.  To  explore  the  impact  of  the  macroenviron-
ment on  the  relationship  between  MMC  and  performance,  we  examine  how  coinciding  with
multimarket  rivals  in  emerging  economies  alters  the  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance.  Our
research,  which  is  developed  with  a  sample  from  the  mobile  telecommunications  industry,
shows that  the  presence  of  MNEs  in  emerging  countries  hinders  the  development  of  mutualMutual  forbearance
and  performance
forbearance  practices  and,  therefore,  reduces  the  positive  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance.
© 2016  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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n  recent  decades,  countries  from  Asia,  Latin  America,
frica  and  the  Middle  East  have  undergone  a  process  in
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reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).hich  government  policies  have  favored  economic  liberal-
zation  and  the  adoption  of  free-market  systems  (Hoskisson
t  al.,  2000).  These  countries  are  known  as  emerging  mar-
et  economies  and,  despite  the  efforts  of  governments  to
ove  toward  a  market-based  economic  system,  they  are
haracterized  by  governmental  discretion,  political  instabil-
ty  and  poor  property  rights  protection  (Meyer  et  al.,  2009).
n  spite  of  these  institutional  voids,  emerging  economies
an  be  an  opportunity  for  foreign  investors  because  of  the
rowth  in  demand  for  many  industries  in  these  economies
Hoskisson  et  al.,  2000).  As  a  consequence,  multinational
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enterprises  (MNEs)  often  base  their  organizational  structure
not  only  in  countries  with  a  higher  institutional  stability,  that
is  advanced  economies,  but  also  in  emerging  economies.
Because  of  the  large  number  of  countries  in  which  MNEs
are  present,  it  is  likely  that  they  will  compete  with  the
same  rivals  in  different  markets  at  the  same  time.  Thus,
besides  the  complexity  of  managing  different  subsidiaries,
MNEs  also  have  to  manage  the  consequences  of  compet-
ing  against  the  same  rivals  in  both  emerging  and  advanced
markets.  Multimarket  contact  theory  analyzes  the  compet-
itive  dynamics  that  arise  in  these  kinds  of  situations,  that
is,  when  ﬁrms  meet  each  other  simultaneously  in  different
markets  (Karnani  and  Wernerfelt,  1985).  Due  to  the  current
globalization  of  competition,  multimarket  contact  (MMC)
has  become  a  frequent  determinant  of  rivalry  between
ﬁrms  (Greve,  2008;  Yu  and  Canella,  2013)  and,  therefore,
MMC  theory  has  gained  momentum  among  strategic  man-
agement  scholars  (Greve,  2008;  Guedri  and  McGuire,  2011;
Upson  et  al.,  2012).  Nevertheless  there  is  still  no  general
agreement  about  the  consequences  of  coinciding  in  mul-
tiple  markets  on  interﬁrm  rivalry.  On  the  one  hand,  some
scholars  have  defended  a  linear  relationship  between  MMC
and  rivalry  (Gimeno  and  Woo,  1996;  Gimeno  and  Woo,  1999;
Greve,  2008).  According  to  these  scholars,  increases  in  MMC
would  always  result  in  a  low  rivalry  between  ﬁrms.  On  the
other  hand,  other  researchers  have  suggested  that  the  rela-
tionship  between  MMC  and  the  intensity  of  rivalry  may  be
represented  as  an  inverted  U-shape  (Baum  and  Korn,  1999;
Fuentelsaz  and  Gómez,  2006;  Haveman  and  Nonnemaker,
2000).  These  researchers  argue  that,  when  MMC  is  low,
rivalry  between  ﬁrms  tends  to  be  high.  However,  when  MMC
is  high,  MMC  rivals  tend  to  tolerate  each  other  and,  as  a
consequence,  the  rivalry  between  them  lowers.
Apart  from  studying  the  relationship  between  MMC  and
interﬁrm  rivalry,  research  has  also  paid  a  lot  of  attention
to  the  contingencies  that  moderate  the  mutual  forbearance
hypothesis  (Yu  and  Canella,  2013).  For  instance,  Gimeno
(1999)  examines  how  the  strategic  importance  of  markets
affects  the  reduction  of  rivalry  between  ﬁrms  in  MMC  envi-
ronments.  Haveman  and  Nonnemaker  (2000)  explore  the
effect  of  mutual  forbearance  in  markets  dominated  by  a
few  large  ﬁrms.  Fuentelsaz  and  Gómez  (2006)  analyze  the
impact  of  strategic  similarity  among  rivals  on  MMC  dynam-
ics  and  Vonortas  (2000)  studies  the  consequences  of  market
and  technological  uncertainty  on  mutual  forbearance  agree-
ments.  As  these  examples  show  prior  research  has  mainly
focused  on  how  industry  and  ﬁrm  characteristics  moder-
ate  the  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance.  However,  with
few  exceptions  (see  Yu  et  al.,  2013),  the  impact  of  the
characteristics  of  the  macroenvironment  on  the  relationship
between  MMC  and  performance  has  been  underexplored.
To  our  knowledge,  there  is  no  previous  study  that  analyzes
whether  the  relationship  between  MMC  and  performance  is
the  same  for  subsidiaries  in  emerging  economies,  prior  MMC
studies  having  tended  to  focus  on  advanced  economies.
Recent  literature  has  highlighted  how  the  features  of
emerging  markets  can  change  the  ﬁndings  of  traditional
managerial  theories  that  have  mainly  been  developed  in
advanced  economies  (Hoskisson  et  al.,  2000).  While  some
authors  suggest  that  it  is  necessary  to  develop  new  theo-
ries  to  explain  the  behavior  of  ﬁrms  in  emerging  economies,
others  understand  that  traditional  theories  are  still
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pplicable  but  need  to  be  extended  if  we  are  to  better
nderstand  the  behavior  and  outcomes  of  ﬁrms  in  this  con-
ext  (Cuervo-Cazurra,  2012).  This  article  seeks  to  analyze
he  extent  to  which  market  overlap  in  emerging  countries
onditions  previous  theory  about  the  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm
erformance.
This  research  argues  that  MMC  has  a  U-shaped  effect  on
rm  performance  and  we  examines  the  inﬂuence  of  MMC
n  ﬁrm  performance,  taking  into  account  the  degree  of
arket  overlap  of  MNEs  in  emerging  countries,  that  is  the
umber  of  emerging  countries  where  MNEs  encounter  their
ultimarket  rivals  in  relation  to  the  total  number  of  mar-
ets  in  which  they  compete  against  multimarket  rivals.  We
ropose  that  MMC  is  more  effective  in  reducing  interﬁrm
ivalry  when  multimarket  rivals  meet  in  advanced  markets
ather  than  in  emerging  markets.  Our  underlying  logic  is  that
he  observation  of  rivals’  behaviors  and  internal  coordina-
ion  among  subsidiaries  may  be  more  difﬁcult  in  emerging
conomies  due  to  information  asymmetries,  uncertainty  and
igher  requirements  of  local  adaptation.  As  a  consequence,
utual  forbearance  dynamics  could  arise  more  naturally
n  advanced  markets  than  in  emerging  markets.  We  test
ur  hypotheses  in  the  mobile  communications  industry  from
000  to  2012  by  considering  MMC  between  the  whole  popu-
ation  of  MNEs  that  coincide  in  emerging  and  non-emerging
arkets  around  the  world.
The  contribution  of  this  study  is  twofold.  First,  we
rovide  evidence  of  the  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance
n  an  international  context.  Whereas  prior  research  mainly
ocused  on  examining  how  industry  and  ﬁrm  characteristics
etermine  the  effect  of  MMC  on  rivalry,  we  pay  attention  to
he  moderating  inﬂuence  of  the  macroeconomic  context  on
MC  dynamics.  Second,  we  extend  MMC  literature  by  sug-
esting  that  MMC  is  more  effective  in  decreasing  rivalry  and
reating  above-average  returns  when  it  mainly  takes  place
n  advanced  markets  rather  than  in  emerging  markets.  A  bet-
er  understanding  of  how  the  context  inﬂuences  the  effect
f  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance  can  enrich  MMC  theory  and  clear
p  some  concerns  about  MMC  dynamics.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  sec-
nd  section,  we  review  the  literature  about  MMC  and  the
ain  characteristics  of  emerging  countries.  This  will  help  us
o  better  understand  the  hypotheses  of  the  third  section.
he  fourth  section  addresses  the  variables  and  the  method-
logy,  and  the  results  are  presented  in  the  ﬁfth  section.  The
ast  section  is  devoted  to  the  main  conclusions  and  future
esearch  lines.
iterature review
ultimarket  contact  competition
MC  theory  describes  the  competitive  dynamics  among  ﬁrms
hat  compete  against  each  other  across  several  markets
Karnani  and  Wernerfelt,  1985).  In  the  ﬁrst  stage,  MMC
ncreases  the  chance  of  direct  competition.  However,  MMC
heory  defends  the  mutual  forbearance  hypothesis  --  i.e.
he  reduction  of  rivalry  between  multimarket  ﬁrms  due  to
he  MMC  between  them  --  and  sustains  that  multimarket
ivals  tend  to  refrain  from  aggressive  competitive  behaviors
n  their  common  markets  (Greve,  2008;  Parker  and  Röller,
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997;  Spagnolo,  1999;  Bernheim  and  Whinston,  1990).  Mul-
imarket  competition  implies  that  ﬁrms  are  able  to  respond
o  an  attack  in  the  market  where  it  takes  place,  in  the  most
mportant  markets  for  the  attacking  ﬁrm  or  even  in  all  the
arkets  where  both  ﬁrms  compete.  As  a  consequence,  mul-
imarket  ﬁrms  tend  to  balance  the  chance  of  achieving  an
dvantage  in  one  market  with  the  risk  of  receiving  retalia-
ory  responses  in  several  markets  or  in  the  most  important
nes.  The  high  risk  of  retaliatory  responses,  which  could  neg-
tively  affect  ﬁrm  performance,  reduces  the  motivation  of
ultimarket  rivals  to  initiate  aggressive  competitive  moves
Gimeno,  1999).
The  debate  about  the  effect  of  MMC  on  rivalry  is  still  open
n  the  MMC  literature.  Some  authors  suggest  that  the  rela-
ionship  between  MMC  and  rivalry  is  linear  (Fu,  2003;  Gimeno
nd  Woo,  1996;  Gimeno  and  Woo,  1999;  Greve,  2008;  Upson
t  al.,  2012).  Accordingly,  rivalry  between  multimarket
ivals  should  always  decrease  as  the  number  of  MMCs  rises.
owever,  other  scholars  have  qualiﬁed  this  contention  by
rguing  that  the  relationship  between  MMC  and  rivalry  may
how  an  inverted  U-shape  (Baum  and  Korn,  1999;  Fuentelsaz
nd  Gómez,  2006;  Haveman  and  Nonnemaker,  2000).  These
uthors  sustain  that  a  certain  level  of  MMC  is  necessary  for
ultimarket  rivals  to  become  aware  of  their  interdepen-
ences  and  begin  to  mutually  forbear.  Before  reaching  this
oint,  rivalry  between  multimarket  ﬁrms  is  intense  because
he  risk  of  retaliatory  responses  is  not  yet  an  important
hreat,  the  recognition  of  competitive  interdependences  has
ot  taken  place  and  ﬁrms  might  have  incentives  to  show
heir  competitive  abilities.
Prior  literature  has  noted  that  two  basic  conditions  must
ome  together  in  order  to  achieve  the  mutual  forbear-
nce:  full  observability  and  effective  internal  coordination
etween  subsidiaries  (Yu  and  Canella,  2013).  First,  deter-
ence  among  multimarket  rivals  requires  that  defections
rom  equilibrium  can  be  detected  and  punished.  As  a
onsequence,  MMC  research  tends  to  assume  that  mutual
orbearance  takes  place  in  a  fully  observable  context
Greve,  2008;  Thomas  and  Willig,  2006;  De  Bonis  and
errando,  2000).  Second,  the  implementation  of  a  mutual
orbearance  strategy  needs  an  efﬁcient  internal  coordina-
ion  among  subunits  (Golden  and  Ma,  2003;  Jayachandran
t  al.,  1999;  Ma,  1998).  The  possibility  of  observing  rivals’
ctions,  as  well  as  the  ease  of  coordination  between  a MNE’s
ubsidiaries,  might  be  lower  in  emerging  economies  due  to
nformation  asymmetries,  uncertainty  and  the  requirements
f  local  adaptation.
merging  and  advanced  economies
n  emerging  market  economy  satisﬁes  two  criteria,  ‘‘a
apid  pace  of  economic  development  and  government  poli-
ies  favoring  economic  liberalization’’  (Hoskisson  et  al.,
000:  249).  Despite  the  rapid  demand  growth  in  emerging
conomies  and  their  efforts  toward  market  openness,  these
conomies  still  have  some  institutional  voids  that  lead  to
ifferent  ‘‘rules  of  the  game’’  (North,  1990) than  those  of
dvanced  economies.
Hitt  et  al.  (2000:  451)  highlights  the  difﬁculties  of  MNEs  to
perate  in  emerging  countries  because  ‘‘the  economic  and
ometimes  social  instability  in  emerging  markets  produces
a
m
s
UB.  Domínguez  et  al.
mbiguity  and  uncertainty  regarding  the  rules  of  exchange’’.
ince  ﬁnancial  markets  are  incipient,  there  is  a  high  volatil-
ty  and  risk  in  making  investments.  Moreover,  Hoskisson  et  al.
2000)  argue  that  emerging  economies  are  characterized
y  underdeveloped  legal  infrastructures,  insufﬁcient  prop-
rty  rights  protection  and  political  discretion  that  result
n  opportunistic  behavior  of  market  agents,  information
symmetries  and  market  uncertainty.  These  characteristics
ncrease  information  and  enforcement  transaction  costs  of
eveloping  business  and  make  network  contacts  and  per-
onal  relations  more  important  to  reduce  the  uncertainty
erived  from  the  institutional  infrastructure  (Johanson  and
ahlne,  2009).  Thus,  emerging  economies  are  a  more  com-
lex  arena  in  which  to  develop  business  than  advanced
conomies.  The  latter  are  characterized  by  lower  uncer-
ainty  because  of  the  strong  development  of  legal,  judicial
nd  executive  systems  that  increase  the  available  informa-
ion  in  a  market  and  improve  the  predictability  of  the  actions
f  market  agents,  such  as  suppliers,  consumers  and  competi-
ors  (Meyer  et  al.,  2009).
ypotheses
MC  and  ﬁrm  performance
nitial  evidence  of  an  inverted  U-shape  in  the  relationship
etween  MMC  and  competitive  behavior  has  been  found  for
arket  entry  rates  (Baum  and  Korn,  1999;  Fuentelsaz  and
ómez,  2006;  Haveman  and  Nonnemaker,  2000;  Stephan
t  al.,  2003),  exit  rates  (Baum  and  Korn,  1999)  and  growth
ates  (Haveman  and  Nonnemaker,  2000).  According  to  these
uthors,  when  MMC  is  low  ﬁrms  have  incentives  to  establish
 foothold  in  the  markets  of  their  rivals  to  signal  their  capac-
ty  to  defend  themselves  from  competitive  moves  (Karnani
nd  Wernerfelt,  1985).  These  initial  actions  may  provoke
imilar  responses  from  competitors,  increasing  the  level  of
ivalry  (Baum  and  Korn,  1999).  As  the  number  of  contacts
ncreases,  MMC  rivals  become  aware  of  the  harmful  conse-
uences  that  a  process  of  competitive  escalation  in  multiple
arkets  would  have  on  their  performances.  Once  the  level
f  MMC  where  ﬁrms  are  aware  of  their  interdependences
s  reached,  rivalry  is  reduced  and  ﬁrms  begin  to  mutually
orbear  in  their  common  markets  (Spagnolo,  1999).
With  very  few  exceptions  (see,  for  example,  Fuentelsaz
t  al.,  2012),  the  inverted  U-shaped  relationship  between
MC  and  rivalry  has  been  found  when  measuring  rivalry
hrough  ﬁrms’  actions  such  as  markets  entries  or  exits.  We
rgue  that  the  curvilinear  relationship  may  also  be  applied
o  analyze  the  relationship  between  MMC  and  ﬁrm  per-
ormance.  When  ﬁrms  coincide  in  more  than  one  market,
heir  dependence  on  similar  resources  increases  (Hannan
nd  Freeman,  1993).  Competition  for  productive  factors
nd  consumers  has  a  negative  effect  on  ﬁrm  performance
Porter,  1985;  Scherer  and  Ross,  1990).  Nevertheless,  as  mul-
imarket  rivals  become  aware  of  their  interdependences,
hey  begin  to  develop  mutual  forbearance  practices  and
void  competitive  escalation.  The  lack  of  competition  allows
ultimarket  rivals  to  obtain  a higher  performance.  As  a  con-
equence,  the  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance  should  be
-shaped.  Accordingly,  our  ﬁrst  hypothesis  proposes:
m
e
M
i
o
n
p
m
t
i
f
e
o
H
c
f
R
T
T
f
t
w
J
i
t
i
w
l
d
c
t
r
t
a
c
o
s
a
t
i
E
t
other  regions,  favoring  the  development  of  communications.
Despite  the  late  introduction  of  mobile  telecommunications
in  emerging  countries,  their  large  growth  in  recent  years  has
2 Notice that our second hypothesis exclusively theorizes about
the positive effect of MMC on ﬁrm performance. Consequently, our
contention only affects the positive slope of the U-shaped effect
proposed in Hypothesis 1.Multimarket  Contact  in  Emerging  Economies  
H1.  MMC  between  MNEs  has  a  U-shaped  effect  on  ﬁrm
performance.
Moderating  effect  of  market  overlap  in  emerging
countries
We  have  said  mutual  forbearance  requires  two  bound-
ary  conditions  to  improve  ﬁrm  performance,  namely,  full
observability  and  internal  coordination  among  the  MNE’s
subunits.  Regarding  the  ﬁrst  condition  MMC  models  tend  to
assume  that  violations  of  mutual  forbearance  agreements
can  always  be  detected  and  punished  (Greve,  2008;  Thomas
and  Willig,  2006;  De  Bonis  and  Ferrando,  2000).  However,
controlling  the  compliance  of  collusive  agreements  may
be  complicated  in  emerging  countries.  Information  asym-
metries,  which  tend  to  be  magniﬁed  in  these  contexts
(Tong  et  al.,  2008;  Meyer  et  al.,  2009),  may  encourage
the  breach  of  mutual  forbearance  agreements  by  reducing
the  chance  of  detecting  violations  and,  therefore,  of  being
punished.  In  addition,  in  emerging  economies,  political
instabilities  and  shocks  frequently  increase  environmental
uncertainty  (Hoskisson  et  al.,  2000),  which  makes  deviation
from  collusive  agreements  even  more  difﬁcult  to  detect.
Thus,  information  asymmetries  and  uncertainty  in  emerging
countries  may  hinder  the  observation  and  interpretation  of
the  actions  of  multimarket  rivals.  In  this  scenario,  MNEs  may
have  incentives  for  opportunistic  behaviors  and  for  deviating
from  mutual  forbearance  agreements.
Mutual  forbearance  also  requires  the  internal  coordina-
tion  and  integration  of  all  the  subsidiaries  (Golden  and  Ma,
2003;  Ma,  1998).  For  instance,  if  a  particular  subsidiary  ini-
tiates  a  competitive  move  in  an  attempt  to  improve  its
position  in  the  country  where  it  operates,  this  move  could
provoke  retaliation  from  a  multimarket  rival  and  losses  for
the  MNE  in  other  countries  where  it  is  competing.  For  the
threat  of  retaliation  to  be  credible  MNEs  must  have  an
efﬁcient  internal  coordination  to  enable  rapid  answers  in
a  certain  market  against  the  attacks  that  have  been  suf-
fered  in  other  markets.  Hence,  in  absence  of  intra-ﬁrm
coordination,  MMC  might  evolve  into  a  market-by-market
competition  process,  in  which  mutual  forbearance  does  not
occur  (Jayachandran  et  al.,  1999).  International  business
literature  has  shown  that  MNEs  often  ﬁnd  it  difﬁcult  to
coordinate  across  markets  because  subsidiaries  feel  pres-
sure  to  be  locally  responsive  rather  than  globally  integrated
(Prahalad  and  Doz,  1987;  Yu  et  al.,  2009).  The  need  to
be  locally  responsive  is  even  more  intense  in  emerging
countries  because  the  success  of  MNEs  in  these  economies
depends,  to  a  great  extent,  on  their  integration  into  local
networks  and  their  adaptation  to  local  governments  (Guillén
and  Garcia-Canal,  2009;  Hoskisson  et  al.,  2000).  In  fact,
MNEs  usually  enter  emerging  economies  through  alliances
with  local  partners.  In  that  way,  they  expect  to  achieve  a
greater  integration  with  the  local  networks  and  the  insti-
tutional  environment  (Johanson  and  Vahlne,  2009).  Local
partners  facilitate  access  to  emerging  economies,  but,  at
the  same  time,  they  make  the  global  coordination  of  sub-
sidiaries  and  the  implementation  of  common  guides  from
headquarters  difﬁcult.  As  a  consequence  of  local  adapta-
tion  and  agreements  with  local  partners,  MMC  dynamics
and  mutual  forbearance  may  not  be  operational  when  MNEs
i
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ainly  compete  against  their  multimarket  rivals  in  emerging
conomies.
According  to  prior  arguments,  mutual  forbearance  among
NEs  is  more  complex  when  they  mainly  coincide  in  emerg-
ng  markets.  The  lack  of  observability  and  the  difﬁculties
f  coordinating  subunits  in  these  markets  hinder  the  recog-
ition  of  competitive  interdependences  and,  therefore,
revent  the  establishment  of  collusive  agreements  among
ultimarket  rivals.  Therefore  we  expect  that  the  greater
he  percentage  of  market  overlap  between  MNEs  in  emerg-
ng  economies,  the  greater  the  difﬁculties  to  develop  mutual
orbearance  practices  and,  thus,  the  weaker  the  positive
ffect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance.2 The  second  hypothesis
f  our  theoretical  model  states  that:
2.  The  greater  the  percentage  of  MMC  in  emerging
ountries,  the  lower  the  positive  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  per-
ormance.
esearch method
he  mobile  telecommunications  industry
he  mobile  telecommunications  industry  is  a  suitable  setting
or  the  purposes  of  this  paper  for  several  reasons.  First,  in
he  90s,  this  industry  underwent  a  process  of  openness  in
hich  operators  started  to  enter  new  markets  (Gerpott  and
akopin,  2005).  This  increase  in  market  entries  led  to  a  rise
n  the  number  of  points  of  competition  between  ﬁrms.  A
ime  frame  from  2000  to  2012  allows  us  to  study  the  full
mpact  of  MMC  on  ﬁrms’  results,  moving  from  a  situation
here  MMC  was  nonexistent  to  a  situation  with  a  moderate
evel  of  MMC.
Mobile  groups3 are  present  all  over  the  world,  in  both
eveloped  and  emerging  countries.  The  European  Union  (EU)
ountries  are  examples  of  countries  with  strong  institutions
hat  support  economic  exchanges  under  a  common  industry
egulation.  Under  the  legal  directives  of  the  EU  institu-
ions,  the  mobile  telecommunications  industry  has  achieved
 high  penetration  rate  in  these  countries  because  of  a
ommon  technological  standard,  GSM,  in  the  ﬁrst  stages
f  mobile  communications.  This  favored  the  creation  of
trong  European  mobile  multinationals,  such  as  Telefonica
nd  Vodafone,  that  started  operating  in  the  EU  markets  and
hat  are  present  in  emerging  countries  as  well.
In  the  vast  majority  of  emerging  countries,  GSM  was
mposed  by  the  national  authorities  not  regionally  as  in  the
U  during  the  1990s  (Fuentelsaz  et  al.,  2005).  The  adop-
ion  of  the  GSM  standard  allowed  interconnectedness  with3 International mobile groups are holdings with economic interests
n at least two different mobile national operators (MNO). There-
ore, international groups are entities that operate through their
articipation in MNOs capital.
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D82  
lowed  down  the  penetration  of  ﬁxed  telephony  (Barros  and
adima,  2000)  and  has  allowed  the  entry  of  foreign  MNEs  and
he  creation  of  new  MNEs  with  their  origin  in  an  emerging
conomy.
ample
he  mobile  telecommunication  industry  is  suitable  for  the
urpose  of  this  paper  and  we  use  the  information  pro-
ided  by  GSMA  Intelligence.4 This  information  includes
uarterly  data  for  51  international  mobile  groups  and  132
ountries  within  a  timeframe  that  covers  2000--2012.  The
ountries  are  divided  into  emerging  countries  and  non-
merging  countries.  To  classify  the  132  countries  of  our
ample  into  emerging  and  non-emerging,  we  have  followed
he  standard  of  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  which
eads  us  to  consider  16  of  the  countries  as  emerging5 and  the
ther  116  as  non-emerging.
ariables
ependent  variable
ur  objective  in  this  paper  is  to  analyze  whether  the  effect
f  MMC  on  performance  could  be  altered  when  that  MMC
akes  place  in  an  emerging  country.  Therefore,  our  depend-
nt  variable  is  the  performance  of  international  mobile
roups.  Following  previous  studies  (Jakopin  and  Klein,  2012;
ung,  2014;  Fuentelsaz  et  al.,  2012),  we  use  the  EBITDA
argin  --  earnings  before  interest,  taxes,  depreciation  and
mortization  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  total  Revenue
- as  a  measure  for  the  international  mobile  groups’  per-
ormance.  Therefore  our  dependent  variable  --  the  EBITDA
argini --  is  a  ratio  where  the  numerator  is  the  total  EBITDA
f  the  group  (EBITDAi)  and  the  denominator  is  the  total  Rev-
nue  of  the  group  (Revenuei).
BITDA  margini =
EBITDAi
Revenuei
ndependent  variables
n  order  to  test  our  ﬁrst  hypothesis,  we  need  to  calculate
he  Multimarket  Contact  (MMC) that  each  group  has  with
he  rest  of  the  groups  of  the  sample.  We  consider  that
here  is  one  multimarket  contact  between  two  international
roups  when  they  compete  in  two  markets  at  the  same  time.
or  example,  Vodafone  and  Telefonica  were  incumbents  in
ermany  at  the  beginning  of  our  timeframe.  When  Voda-
one  entered  Spain  in  2001,6 where  Telefonica  had  launched
4 https://gsmaintelligence.com/.
5 Countries that are considered as emerging are: Argentina,
ulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
alaysia, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Turkey and
kraine. Other emerging countries such as Brazil, India and Russia
re not included in our sample since the licenses in these countries
re not given for all the country but only for some regions within it.
6 In this study, we consider that an international group is present
n a market when it has a participation of at least 30% in the capital
f any mobile operator that is present in that market. Our premise
s that below this threshold the group may not have a sufﬁcient
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ts  services  some  years  before,  it  established  the  ﬁrst  MMC
etween  these  two  groups.
To  construct  our  measure  of  MMC,  we  begin  with  a  sim-
le  measure  of  MMC  --  that  is  the  total  number  of  markets
here  the  focal  international  group  encounters  the  rest  of
he  groups.  In  order  to  be  included  in  this  ﬁrst  measure  of
MC,  we  require  that  each  pair  of  groups  meets  in  at  least
wo  markets  since  only  then  is  there  multimarket  contact
etween  them.  If  the  focal  group  only  competes  with  a  cer-
ain  rival  in  one  market,  this  pair  of  groups  is  not  included
n  the  simple  measure  of  MMC  of  the  focal  group.
Once  we  have  the  simple  measure  of  MMC  between  the
ocal  group  and  its  multimarket  rivals,  we  need  to  weight
t  since  each  group  competes  with  a  different  number  of
ultimarket  rivals  (Gimeno  and  Jeong,  2001).  For  instance,
t  is  very  different  if  group  i  encounters  its  3  multimarket
ivals  in  6  markets  than  if  it  has  the  same  volume  of  MMC
ut  only  with  one  multimarket  rival.  In  the  ﬁrst  case,  group  i
as  fewer  MMCs  than  in  the  second.  So  we  weight  the  simple
easure  of  MMC  by  the  number  of  multimarket  rivals  that
he  focal  group  has.
Therefore,  our  measure  of  MMC  for  each  group  and  time
- MMCit --  is  calculated  as  follows:
MCit =
∑
j
∑
n
Iint  ∗  Ijnt
∑
j
Iint
here  j and  n  refer  to  a  certain  multimarket  rival  and  coun-
ry,  respectively,  Iint  is  a  dummy  variable  that  takes  value  1
f  group  i  is  present  in  market  n  and  0  otherwise,  and  Ijnt  is
 dummy  variable  that  takes  value  1  if  group  j  is  present  in
arket  n,  and  0  otherwise.  Therefore,  the  numerator  of  our
MC  variable  calculates  the  number  of  markets  where  the
ocal  group  i encounters  each  other  group,  j,  included  in  our
ample.  As  mentioned  before,  only  those  pairs  of  groups  that
eet  in  at  least  two  markets  are  included  in  the  numerator.
he  denominator  of  our  MMC  variable  measures  the  number
f  multimarket  contact  rivals  of  the  focal  ﬁrm  i.
To  illustrate  this  variable,  we  give  an  example.  If  we
ake  Vodafone  as  the  focal  group,  we  ﬁrst  need  to  count
he  number  of  markets  where  it  competes  with  the  rest  of
he  groups.  Taking  into  account  the  premise  of  competing
n  at  least  two  markets  at  the  same  time,  at  the  end  of
012,  Vodafone  competes  in  2  markets  with  Bharti,  4  with
eutsche  Telekom,  5  with  Orange,  4 with  Hutchison,  2  with
PN,  2  with  MTN,  3  with  OTE,  5  with  Telefonica  and  2  with
urkcell.  Thus,  Vodafone  has  a  total  of  29  market  overlaps
ith  the  rest  of  the  groups  that  is  the  numerator  of  the
atio.7 Since  it  has  9  multimarket  rivals  at  that  time,  the
enominator  of  our  variable,  we  divide  the  total  number  of
arket  overlaps  by  9.  Therefore,  in  the  last  period  of  2012
odafone  has  3.222  MMCs  with  the  rest  of  the  international
roups  that  are  included  in  our  sample.
nﬂuence over the operator to modify its competitive behavior and,
herefore, reach the forbearance result.
7 Vodafone also competes with other groups, such as Digicel, Eti-
alat and Millicom but only in one market so those pairs of groups
Vodafone-X) are not included in the measure of its market overlap.
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Our  second  hypothesis  proposes  that  the  higher  the  per-
centage  of  MMC  in  emerging  countries  (%MMCEC),  the  lower
the  positive  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance.  Therefore,
our  measure  of  MMC  in  emerging  countries  is  expressed  as  a
percentage  of  total  MMC.
%MMCECit = MMC  in  emerging  coutriesiTotal  MMCi
Total  MMCi is  calculated  in  the  same  way  as  the  MMC  vari-
able  used  to  test  our  ﬁrst  hypothesis,  that  is,  by  adding  up
the  total  number  of  markets  where  group  i  encounters  its
multimarket  rivals  j.  MMC  in  emerging  countriesi is  the  total
number  of  emerging  markets  where  group  i  competes  with
each  of  its  multimarket  rivals  j.  As  in  the  construction  of
our  MMC  variable,  we  require  group  i  to  meet  a  certain
rival  group  in  more  than  one  emerging  market  in  order  to
include  the  pair  of  groups  in  the  measure  of  market  overlap
in  emerging  countries  of  group  i.
Control  variables
We  control  for  some  group  and  market  characteristics.
Regarding  the  group  characteristics,  we  control  for  the  size
of  the  group  since  a  bigger  group  may  achieve  better  results
more  easily.  We  measure  the  size  of  the  group  by  its  Total
Connections.8 Furthermore,  since  our  dependent  variable
of  performance  does  not  distinguish  between  the  markets
of  the  focal  group  i  but  is  common  for  every  market  where  i
is  present,  we  include  a  variable  of  the  Number  of  markets
where  the  focal  group  is  present.  The  argument  rests  on  the
idea  that  a  group  that  is  present  in  10  countries  has  more
markets  that  allow  it  to  generate  results  than  a  group  that
is  only  present  in  3.  Therefore,  one  could  expect  the  perfor-
mance  variable  of  the  ﬁrst  group  to  be  bigger  than  the  total
performance  variable  of  the  second.
In  relation  to  market  characteristics,  we  control  for  mar-
ket  concentration  --  measured  through  the  Herﬁndahl  Index
-- since  it  has  been  said  that  more  concentrated  markets
lead  to  better  results  due  to  the  lack  of  competition  (Gómez
and  Maícas,  2011;  Sung,  2014).  Since  our  dependent  variable
does  not  distinguish  the  amount  generated  by  each  market
that  makes  up  the  total  performance  variable  of  the  group
but  is  common  for  every  market  where  the  focal  group  is
present,  we  multiply  the  importance  that  market  has  for
the  focal  group  by  the  Herﬁndahl  Index  of  the  focal  market
--  Herﬁndahl  market.  The  measure  of  market  importance
for  each  group  has  been  calculated  as  the  percentage  of
the  Total  Revenue  of  the  group  that  comes  from  that  mar-
ket.  The  bigger  the  percentage  of  the  total  revenue  of  the
focal  group  that  comes  from  a  certain  market,  the  more  the
importance  of  that  market  for  the  focal  group.
We  also  control  for  the  market  penetration  of  mobile
telecommunications  since  a  higher  penetration  could  lead
to  better  results  due  to  higher  demand.  Following  the
deﬁnition  of  GSMA,  market  penetration  is  calculated  as
total  connections  at  the  end  of  the  period,  expressed  as
8 According to GSMA Intelligence, Total Connections are deﬁned
as total unique SIM cards (or phone numbers, where SIM cards are
not used), including cellular M2M that have been registered on the
mobile network at the end of the period.
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 percentage  share  of  the  total  market  population.  As  in
he  previous  variable,  we  multiply  the  penetration  rate  of
obile  telecommunications  in  the  market  by  the  impor-
ance  of  that  market  for  the  focal  group  --  Penetration
arket.
We  include  the  population  of  the  market  in  our  regres-
ion  since  a  market  with  a larger  population  could  lead  to
etter  results  due  to  the  bigger  demand  in  the  market.  In
he  same  way  as  before,  we  multiply  the  importance  of  the
arket  for  the  focal  group  by  the  population  of  that  market
-  Population  market.
For  the  last  of  our  market  characteristics,  we  include  GDP
er  capita  because  countries  with  greater  wealth  may  spend
ore  on  mobile  telecommunications  (Gruber  and  Verboven,
001) and,  therefore,  the  results  of  the  group  in  these
ountries  could  be  higher.  As  in  the  previous  variable,  we
ultiply  GDP  per  capita  in  the  market  by  its  importance  for
he  focal  group  --  GDP  pc  market.  Finally,  we  include  yearly
nd  quarterly  dummy  variables  in  order  to  control  for  year
nd  seasonal  effects.
ata  analysis
ables  1  and  2  summarize  the  descriptive  statistics  and  cor-
elations,  respectively,  for  the  variables  included  in  our
nalysis.  As  can  be  seen,  the  values  of  our  dependent  vari-
ble  mainly  range  from  −1  to  1  and  our  MMC  variable  from  0
o  6.  Therefore,  international  groups  that  have  the  biggest
umber  of  MMC  with  their  multimarket  rivals,  Cableand-
ireless  and  America  Movil,  only  compete  with  them  in  six
ountries  at  the  same  time.
Regarding  the  correlations,  MMC  is  negatively  correlated
ith  the  dependent  variable,  indicating  that  ﬁrms  that
imultaneously  compete  with  their  rivals  in  different  mar-
ets  achieve  worse  results  than  those  that  only  compete
ith  them  in  one  market.  Moreover,  the  negative  correlation
etween  %MOEC  and  the  EBITDA  margin  indicates  that,  when
ultimarket  contact  takes  place  in  emerging  countries,
he  negative  effect  of  MMC  on  performance  is  even
orse.
ethod
e  perform  a  number  of  tests  to  select  the  speciﬁcation  of
ur  model.  First,  the  Breusch-Pagan  Lagrange  Multiplier  test
ejects  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  variance  of  the  ﬁrm-
evel  component  of  the  error  term  is  zero  (2 =  27,672.46;
 <  0.01).  Therefore,  there  is  ﬁrm-level  unobserved  het-
rogeneity  in  our  sample.  Using  panel  data  techniques
s  recommended  in  this  scenario.  Firm-level  unobserved
eterogeneity  can  be  modeled  as  a random  effect  or  as
 ﬁxed  effect.  We  use  the  Hausman  test  to  select  the
ppropriate  speciﬁcation  in  this  case.  The  test  generates  a
egative  result  (2 =  −47.96),  which  must  be  interpreted  as
trong  evidence  that  the  null  hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected
nd,  therefore,  ﬁrm-level  unobserved  heterogeneity  must
e  modeled  as  a  random  effect.  Consequently,  we  esti-
ate  a  random  effects  model  controlling  for  ﬁrm  and  year
ffects.
284  B.  Domínguez  et  al.
Table  1  Descriptive  statistics.
Variable  N  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max
1.  EBITDAm Group 8635  0.31  0.158  −0.69  1.1
2. MMC  8635  2.49  0.99  0  6
3. %MOEC  8635  0.07  0.18  0  1
4. Total  Connectionsa 8635  6785.36  7341.98  8.41  39,291.5
5. Number  of  markets  8635  12.17  8.56  1  38
6. Herﬁndahl  market  8635  693.58  1095.71  0.05  9174.6
7. Penetration  market  8635  0.15  0.26  0  1.86
8. Population  marketa 8635  630.61  1583.8  0  13,254.54
9. GDP  pc  market 8635  2912.47 6435.43  0.01  84,968
a Variables divided by 10,000.
Table  2  Correlations.
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
1.  EBITDAm  Group  1
2. Total  Connectionsa 0.09* 1
3. Number  of  markets  −0.09* 0.42* 1
4. Herﬁndahl  market  0  −0.24* −0.42* 1
5. Penetration  market  −0.04* −0.16* −0.37* 0.82* 1
6. Population  marketa 0.02* −0.08* −0.22* 0.64* 0.54* 1
7. GDP  pc  −0.13* −0.13* −0.28* 0.64* 0.77* 0.46* 1
8. MMC  −0.03* 0.43* 0.64* −0.41* −0.29* −0.32* −0.26* 1
9. %  MOEC  −0.06* 0  −0.11* 0.004  0.04* −0.03* −0.01  018* 1
*
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esults
able  3  shows  the  results  of  our  estimations.  Column  1  shows
he  baseline  model  that  only  considers  the  control  varia-
les.  The  model  is  globally  signiﬁcant,  which  conﬁrms  the
mportance  of  our  control  variables.  Hypothesis  1  states
hat  MMC  has  a  U-shaped  effect  on  ﬁrm  performance.  Col-
mn  2  includes  the  variable  MMC  and  column  3  adds  its
quared  effect.  The  parameter  of  the  direct  effect  of  MMC  in
olumn  2  is  not  signiﬁcant;  however,  in  column  3,  the  param-
ter  of  the  direct  effect  of  MMC  is  negative  (ˇ  =  −0.0287;
 <  0.05)  and  the  parameter  of  the  squared  effect  is  positive
ˇ  =  0.00686;  p  <  0.10).  This  suggests  the  predicted  U-shaped
ffect  but,  for  this  curvilinear  effect  to  be  meaningful  in  our
stimations,  the  inﬂection  point  has  to  belong  to  the  range
f  values  of  MMC  observed  in  our  sample.  The  inﬂection  point
orresponds  to  the  value  2.092  of  the  variable,  which  falls
ithin  the  range  of  our  sample.
Therefore,  Hypothesis  1  is  supported  by  our  estimations.
o  better  illustrate  our  results,  Graph  1  depicts  the  effect
f  multimarket  contact  within  the  range  of  values  of  our
ample.  As  the  graph  shows,  the  inﬂuence  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm
erformance  is  negative  up  to  a  certain  threshold  and,  then,
t  becomes  positive  as  MMC  increases.  As  a  consequence,  we
an  conclude  that  MNEs  that  compete  through  medium  levels
f  MMC  perform  worse  than  MNEs  whose  degree  of  MMC  is
ow  or  high.
Hypothesis  2  states  that  the  positive  effect  of  MMC  on
rm  performance  is  less  intense  when  market  overlap  among
t
i
f
mGraph  1  The  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance.
NEs  takes  place  in  emerging  contexts.  Column  4 includes
he  interaction  term  of  MMC  with  the  percentage  of  market
verlap  in  emerging  countries.  The  F-tests  at  the  bottom
f  the  table  conﬁrm  that  the  full  model  --  column  4  --  is
referred  to  its  simpler  counterparts.  The  parameter  of  the
nteraction  term  between  the  percentage  of  market  over-
ap  in  emerging  countries  and  the  direct  effect  of  MMC  is
ositive  (ˇ  =  0.183;  p  <  0.05),  while  the  parameter  of  the
nteraction  term  between  the  percentage  of  market  over-
ap  in  emerging  countries  and  the  squared  effect  of  MMC  is
egative  (ˇ  =  −0.0566;  p  <  0.01).  The  combination  of  these
wo  effects  has  an  ambiguous  interpretation.  To  understand
t  better,  Graph  2  depicts  the  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  per-
ormance  for  different  values  of  the  variable  percentage  of
arket  overlap  in  emerging  countries.
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Table  3  The  inﬂuence  of  MMC  on  performance  and  the  moderation  effect  of  %MOEC  on  that  relationship.
Dependent  variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
EBITDAm  Groupi EBITDAm  Groupi EBITDAm  Groupi EBITDAm  Groupi
MMC  −0.00492  −0.0287** −0.0439***
(−0.59)  (−2.17)  (−3.48)
MMC2 0.00686* 0.0142***
(1.75)  (3.48)
MMC*%MOEC  0.183**
(2.54)
MMC2*%MOEC  −0.0566***
(−2.77)
% MOEC −0.0607
(−0.67)
Total  Connections  −0.00000162* −0.00000160* −0.00000180* −0.00000147*
(−1.71)  (−1.70)  (−1.94)  (−1.66)
Number of  markets  −0.00263*** −0.00230** −0.00281** −0.00451***
(−3.08)  (−2.07)  (−2.34)  (−4.02)
Herﬁndahl  market  −0.0000189  −0.0000198  −0.0000226  −0.0000255
(−1.19) (−1.25)  (−1.44)  (−1.62)
Penetration  market  −0.0382  −0.0348  −0.0209  −0.0204
(−0.88) (−0.77)  (−0.46)  (−0.44)
Population  market  0.00000457  0.00000397  0.00000307  0.00000469
(0.40) (0.36)  (0.28)  (0.44)
GDP pc  market  0.00000457  0.00000397  0.00000307  0.00000469
(0.40) (0.36)  (0.28)  (0.44)
YEAR D  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
QUARTER  D  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Constant  0.427*** 0.437*** 0.452*** 0.458***
(18.58)  (16.51)  (16.43)  (16.63)
N 8635  8635  8635  8635
Adj. R2 0.1004  0.1010  0.1059  0.1163
F-test vs.  1  0.34  4.71* 18.28***
F-test  vs.  2  3.08* 15.74***
F-test  vs.  3  9.78**
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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oGraph  2  Effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance  for  different
percentages  of  market  overlap  in  emerging  countries. r
eThe  solid  line  shows  the  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  perfor-
ance  when  MNEs  have  an  average  market  overlap  with
heir  multimarket  rivals  in  emerging  countries.  The  dotted
ine  shows  the  inﬂuence  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance  when
he  percentage  of  market  overlap  in  emerging  countries  is
0%  above  the  average  value  of  the  variable  and  the  dashed
ine  represents  this  inﬂuence  when  the  percentage  of  mar-
et  overlap  in  emerging  countries  is  50%  below  the  average
alue  of  the  variable.  As  Graph  2  shows,  the  positive  effect
f  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance  decreases  as  the  percentage
f  market  overlap  in  emerging  countries  increases.  These
esults  support  our  second  hypothesis,  conﬁrming  that  the
resence  of  MNEs  in  emerging  economies  hinders  the  devel-
pment  of  mutual  forbearance  agreements  and,  therefore,
educes  the  positive  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance.
Finally,  to  understand  our  results  better,  we  depict  the
ffect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance  for  situations  in  which
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sraph  3  Effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance  when  MMC  takes
lace in  emerging  countries.
NEs  only  compete  against  their  multimarket  rivals  in
merging  countries.  As  Graph  3  shows,  the  effect  of  MMC  on
rm  performance  is  mainly  negative  when  MMC  among  MNEs
nly  takes  place  in  emerging  countries.  This  could  mean
hat  mutual  forbearance  dynamics  are  not  present  when
NEs  only  compete  with  their  multimarket  rivals  in  emerging
ountries.  The  difﬁculties  involved  in  observing  and  inter-
reting  the  behavior  of  rivals,  as  well  as  the  problems  of
oordinating  their  subunits  in  emerging  contexts,  may  pre-
ent  completely  the  development  of  collusive  agreements.
e  devote  further  attention  to  this  ﬁnding  in  the  following
ection.
iscussion and  conclusions
owadays,  MNEs  are  present  in  many  countries.  As  a
onsequence,  they  tend  to  compete  against  their  rivals
imultaneously  in  different  markets.  This  research  explores
MC  dynamics  among  MNEs  and  shows  that  MMC  has  a
-shaped  effect  on  ﬁrm  performance.  This  ﬁnding  con-
ributes  to  the  reaching  of  a  consensus  in  MMC  literature
y  conﬁrming  the  curvilinear  relationship  between  MMC
nd  performance  in  an  international  context  (Baum  and
orn,  1999;  Fuentelsaz  and  Gómez,  2006;  Haveman  and
onnemaker,  2000).  Our  results  show  that,  when  MMC  is
ow,  rivalry  between  MNEs  is  intense.  However,  when  MMC  is
igh,  MNEs  prefer  to  tolerate  each  other  and,  thus,  rivalry
etween  them  decreases,  with  a  consequent  improvement
n  ﬁrm  results.  Therefore,  MNEs  that  compete  through  mod-
rate  levels  of  MMC  perform  worse  than  MNEs  whose  MMC  is
igh  or  low.
In  addition,  we  show  that  the  positive  effect  of  MMC  on
rm  performance,  that  is  the  positive  slope  of  the  U-shaped
ffect,  is  less  intense  as  the  percentage  of  market  over-
ap  with  multimarket  rivals  in  emerging  countries  increases.
his  ﬁnding  is  consistent  with  our  theoretical  framework
hat  suggests  that  collusive  agreements  among  MNEs  are  dif-
cult  to  establish  in  emerging  contexts.  Apparently,  the  two
asic  conditions  of  mutual  forbearance  among  multimar-
et  ﬁrms,  namely,  full  observability  and  efﬁcient  internal
oordination,  are  not  present  in  emerging  countries.  With
espect  to  full  observability,  it  seems  that  information  asym-
etries  and  environmental  uncertainty  that  characterize
merging  economies  (Tong  et  al.,  2008;  Meyer  et  al.,  2009)
ake  the  behavior  of  multimarket  rivals  less  observable
nd  interpretable.  Concerning  the  internal  coordination  of
o
M
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ubunits,  our  results  suggest  that  the  need  for  local  adap-
ation  and  agreements  with  local  partners  in  emerging
conomies  (Guillén  and  Garcia-Canal,  2009;  Johanson  and
ahlne,  2009;  Hoskisson  et  al.,  2000)  hinders  the  coordi-
ation  of  subsidiaries  and  obstructs  the  implementation  of
ommon  guides  from  headquarters.
By  exploring  MMC  dynamics  in  emerging  contexts,  our
ontribution  to  previous  literature  is  twofold.  First,  our
ndings  help  to  advance  MMC  literature  by  analyzing  the
xtent  to  which  the  macroeconomic  environment  mode-
ates  the  mutual  forbearance  hypothesis  (Yu  and  Canella,
013).  As  mentioned,  prior  research  has  mainly  focused  on
xploring  how  industry  and  ﬁrms  characteristics  moderate
he  effect  of  MMC  on  ﬁrm  performance  (Gimeno,  1999;
aveman  and  Nonnemaker,  2000;  Fuentelsaz  and  Gómez,
006).  Second,  since  prior  MMC  studies  have  tended  to  focus
n  advanced  economies,  our  research  is  one  of  the  ﬁrst  to
xplore  whether  the  relationship  between  MMC  and  perfor-
ance  is  the  same  for  subsidiaries  in  emerging  countries.  In
his  regard,  we  also  shed  light  on  the  debate  about  how  the
acroeconomic  features  of  emerging  markets  can  change
he  ﬁndings  of  traditional  managerial  theories  (Hoskisson
t  al.,  2000).  Our  results  show  that  mutual  forbearance  can-
ot  be  sustained  in  emerging  countries,  which  reduces  the
pplicability  of  MMC  theory  in  this  kind  of  contexts.
Our  research  has  several  limitations  that  may  constitute
venues  for  future  research.  First,  this  research  studies  the
oderating  effect  of  the  macroeconomic  context  in  the
elationship  between  MMC  and  performance.  We  explore
he  way  in  which  market  overlap  in  emerging  countries,
hich  are  characterized  by  governmental  discretion,  polit-
cal  instability  and  poor  property  rights  protection  (Meyer
t  al.,  2009),  affects  mutual  forbearance  practices  and,
herefore,  the  impact  of  MMC  on  performance.  To  further
xplore  how  the  macroeconomic  context  conditions  MMC
ynamics  among  MNEs,  future  research  should  separately
nalyze  the  moderating  effect  of  different  institutional
actors.  For  instance,  future  research  could  study  how  gov-
rnmental  discretion  has  an  impact  on  mutual  forbearance
mong  multimarket  rivals  or  the  effect  of  property  rights
rotection  on  MMC  dynamics.
Second,  using  international  mobile  telecommunications
ata  may  affect  our  results  in  different  ways.  For  exam-
le,  we  had  to  remove  some  signiﬁcant  emerging  markets,
uch  as  Brazil,  from  our  sample  because  they  assign  licenses
ith  regional,  not  national,  coverage.  Therefore,  although
wo  international  groups  were  present  in  one  of  the  mar-
ets  removed  may  not  compete  directly.  Additionally,  results
ay  be  affected  by  the  international  strategy  that  the
rms  follow.  In  the  telecommunications  industry,  MNEs  usu-
lly  follow  a  multidomestic  (country-by-country)  strategy,
hich  makes  them  more  dependent  on  local  resources  and
ncreases  the  pressures  they  face  to  gain  legitimacy  locally
Ghoshal  and  Westney,  1993;  Rosenzweig  and  Singh,  1991).
t  can  make  mutual  forbearance  especially  difﬁcult,  as  we
roposed  in  Hypothesis  2.  It  would  be  interesting  to  extend
his  study  to  other  industries  in  which  MNEs  follow  a  global
trategy  to  observe  whether  results  change  as  a  consequence
f  the  international  strategy  followed  by  MNEs.
With  respect  to  managerial  implications,  managers  of
NEs  have  to  deal  with  the  complexity  of  supervising  sub-
idiaries  located  in  both  developed  and  emerging  countries.
GG
G
G
G
G
H
H
H
H
J
J
J
K
M
M
N
P
P
P
R
S
S
SMultimarket  Contact  in  Emerging  Economies  
They  are  in  charge  of  managing  the  consequences  of  com-
peting  against  the  same  rivals  simultaneously  in  different
markets,  that  is,  they  have  to  handle  MMC  with  other  MNEs.
Our  ﬁndings  are  of  utmost  importance  for  managers  in  this
regard.  As  Graph  3  shows,  the  effect  of  MMC  on  performance
is  mainly  negative  when  market  overlap  with  multimarket
rivals  only  takes  place  in  emerging  countries.  This  shows
that  reaching  collusive  agreements  in  emerging  countries  is
not  possible  and  implies  that  MNEs  that  operate  exclusively
in  these  countries  cannot  take  advantage  of  MMC  dynamics.
Therefore,  managers  interested  in  developing  MMC  strate-
gies  to  beneﬁt  from  mutual  forbearance  with  rivals  should
direct  the  growth  of  their  ﬁrms  toward  developed  countries.
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